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THE LAW OF OBSCENITY -WHERE
EDWIN W.

HAS IT GONE?

Tuccaa*

Some writers have already sounded the death knell for the law of obscenity. It died, they say, sometime during the 1960's at the hands of the Supreme
Court.' Proponents of "decency" and "morality" complain of the supposed
2
rampant escalation of sexual degeneracy taking place throughout the land.
In some parts of the country "topless" dancers are being challenged by
"topless-bottomless" performers. 3 Motion pictures proclaimed boldly and
proudly as major breakthroughs in the candid treatment of sex relations,
the use of so-called "locker room language," and the exhibition of the bare
human body enjoy short-lived landmark status. Gradually, they are challenged by new films ushered in amidst pronouncements ridiculing that which
has gone before, belittling prior efforts as too guarded, too prudish, too
childish, too out of touch with reality. Oh! Calcutta!, for the moment, reigns
supreme in the theater of nudity. But, is its more candid, more libertine,
more "true to life" successor already in the wings, waiting to disrobe? Avant* B.A. 1948, New York University; LL.B. 1951, Harvard University; LL.M. 1963, J.S.D.

1964, New York University; M.A. 1967, Trinity College (Hartford); Member of the Bars
of the State of New York, Southern and Eastern Federal District Courts in New York,
Court of Appeals (Second Circuit), Supreme Court of the United States; Professor of Business Law, University of Connecticut.
1. "So far as writers are concerned there is no longer a law of obscenity." C. REMBAR,
THE END OF OnscENrry 490 (1968). Does government have a legitimate interest in regard
to what is said or published? For a negative response, see Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 CoLu.m. L. Rxv. 391 (1963).
2. Expressions of concern in this area can be found in Hearings Before the Subcomm.

on Postal Operations of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, (H.R.), 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 91-12, pt. 1, at 1-74 (1969). See also 115 CONG. REc. E 5676-77, E 5739-40,
E 5814-5715, E 5870, E 5904-05 (1969) (remarks of Congressman Dulski). In Oct. 1967
President Johnson approved Pub. L. No. 90-100, 81 Stat. 253. The Commission, an advisory
body to the Congress, was directed to study and report on the "causal relationship" of
obscene and pornographic materials to "antisocial behavior," and "to recommend advisable,
appropriate, effective, and constitutional means to deal effectively with such traffic." Congress asked the Commission "to evaluate and recommend definitions of obscenity and
pornography."
3. In In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 208, 209-10, 446 P.2d 535, 536-37, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655,
656-57 (1968), the court ruled that topless dancing per se "before an audience for entertainment cannot be held to violate the statutory prohibitions of indecent exposure and
lewd or dissolute conduct in the absence of proof that the dance, tested in the context of
contemporary community standards, appealed to the prurient interest of the audience and
affronted standards of decency generally accepted in the community." However, in City
of Portland v. Derrington, 451 P.2d 111 (Ore. 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S.
Nov. 11, 1969), the court sustained an ordinance that made it "unlawful for any female
person to appear or be in a place where food or alcoholic beverage is offered for sale
for consumption on the premises, so costumed or dressed that one or both breasts are
wholly or substantially exposed to public view." "Topless" dancing was not seen as "a mode
of expression," but "conduct" that government can regulate. For a like result see Jones v.
City of Birmingham, 224 So. 2d 922 (Ala. 1969).

[547]
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garde publishers are riding a crest of sexual success. Publishers in general
are avidly devoting themselves to a production of an endless flow of material
dedicated to describing various feats of sexual activity and nudity, within a
context of four letter words.
The law of obscenity, however, is not dead. Too many persons have
mistaken complexity, diversity, and change as evidence of its demise. During
the past two decades a fragmented Supreme Court, time and again speaking
through a plurality rather than a majority, has haphazardly constructed a
body of constitutional principles in the obscenity area. The inability of a
majority of the justices to arrive at a formula that can be readily stated
and consistently applied lends an aura of accuracy to the assertion that there
can no longer be any constitutional constraints grounded on obscenity.
Disagreement, inconsistency, and vacillation are not, however, synonymous
with a carte blanche approach to the individual's liberty to listen, to read, to
see, to speak, and to publish under the first and fourteenth amendments.
This article has a twofold purpose: first, to explore the development
of the Supreme Court's tests of the constitutionality of federal and state
obscenity laws; and second, to analyze the current Supreme Court definition
of obscenity under the first and fourteenth amendments. 4 Many questions
remain unanswered, for example, the question of obscenity in the context
of television broadcasting. 5 Future members of the Supreme Court may revert
4. Since courts time and again have considered the meaning of "obscene" in the context
of various other issues, a number of such other issues will be tangentially referred to in
the course of this article. How they are treated has an impact on the meaning ascribed
to "obscene." Vagueness of a statutory directive is an issue frequently dealt with by the
courts. The Supreme Court, sustaining the use of "obscene" in a statute, pointed out that
procedural due process "'does not require impossible standards'; all that is required is
that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practices.'" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491
(1957). "Sacrilegious" has been condemned as too vague a standard. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). In Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968), the Supreme
Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a state penal law that "prohibited the sale
of 'any . . . magazines . . . which would appeal to the lust of persons under the age of
eighteen years or to their curiosity as to sex or to the anatomical differences between
the sexes .... .'
The court, in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676
(1968), found unconstitutionally vague an ordinance that set a standard of "not suitable
for young persons." The word "immoral" has been found to be too vague a standard.
State v. Reese, 222 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1969).
5. The Federal Communications Commission is expressly denied any "power of
censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station."
47 U.S.C. §326 (1964). Commenting on this statutory limitation placed on the Commission the Supreme Court has said: "Thus, expressly applying this country's tradition of
free expression to the field of radio broadcasting, Congress has from the first emphatically
forbidden the Commission to exercise any power of censorship over radio communications."
Farmers Educ. Cooperative Union of America v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 526, 529-30 (1959).
When the Court first ruled that motion pictures are protected by the first amendment,
it acknowledged that the motion picture was the kind of medium that might, under
certain circumstances, be treated somewhat differently from other media for constitutional
purposes. "Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise
rules governing any other particular method of expression. Each method tends to present
its own peculiar problems." Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952). In a
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to one of the already voiced but unpopular positions, thus elevating a
minority view to that of a majority. During the 1970's variations of earlier
pronounced principles may appear. In such a setting all omissions must be
carefully considered. 6 Due to the various shades of disagreement that mark
the thinking of the Court, even moderate paraphrasing can be hazardous.
Today's principles relate to particular words and phrases that, even if slightly
altered, can produce telling effects. Since the principles are many, varied, and
always intimately related, the end product-the final enumeration-resembles
a collage. The constitutional principles governing obscenity are loosely
related, but related they are. One must keep in mind that he is dealing
with bits and parts that when assembled, will present an appearance of oneness- interlacing, although not very neatly, with one another.
IN THE BEGINNING

The answer to a question posed in the abstract often differs from the
answer given to the very same question when it requires a particularized
response. Such a dissimilar dichotomy is found in the way the Supreme Court
has described the power of government over obscenity both when it alluded
to the power in dicta and when it had to finally come to grips with the
precise query: What is the nature and extent of the police power when it is
used to proscribe speech and press on the ground that the spoken or written
word and words are obscene? The criterion of constitutionality contained in
the dicta was expressed in terms of "reasonableness."
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire7 the Court sustained a conviction under
a state law that prohibited "any offensive, derisive or annoying word" to
another person on "any street or other public place," or calling another "by

similar vein, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969),
Justice White, speaking for the Court, citing Burstyn, stated: "[A]lthough broadcasting is
clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment interest . . . differences in the characteristics of a new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them." Of special relevance to the law of obscenity is the following portion of Justice
White's opinion: "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount . . . . It is the right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other items and experiences which is crucial here."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 390. "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language
by means of radio communications shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. §1464 (1964). This section has withstood a
challenge to its constitutionality on the ground that it contravenes the tenth amendment;
the court finding it a valid exercise of the power of Congress over interstate commerce.
Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966).
6. Newcomers to the Court may share all or a portion of the thinking of past and
present members of the Supreme Court. Because change in the membership of the Court
will undoubtedly proceed at an above average rate for the next several years, one seeking
a definition of "obscene" must pay close attention to the ideas expressed to date by members
of the Court. "Why" a case was decided the way it was, rather than "how" it was decided,
must be assigned prime importance in one's analytical approach if he is to arrive at a
viable definition of "obscene."
7. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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an offensive or derisive name." The defendant was charged with publicly
having called a city marshal "a God damned racketeer" and a "damned
Fascist." The contention that the statute contravened the fourteenth amendment was hastily brushed aside. Justice Murphy, speaking for a unanimous
Court, found that the statute had not been applied so as to "substantially
or unreasonably" infringe "upon the privilege of free speech." Freedom of
"expression" had not been "unduly" impaired. "Allowing the broadest scope
to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances."8 Stating that there were "certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any constitutional problem" the Court cited as
examples "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
In sharp contrast to what was to follow, Justice
or 'fighting' words .....
Murphy wrote: 9
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
Winters v. New York 1° foretold the general direction the Supreme Court
was to take in the decades ahead. While the dissenters spoke of the reasonableness of the state's prohibition, the majority condemned the challenged
statute as vague, striking it down as violative of the fourteenth amendment."

8. Id. at 571.
9. Id. at 572. In State v. Ceci, 255 A.2d 700 (Del. Super.), the court sustained breach
of the peace convictions based on the public distribution of leaflets headed: "Up Against
the Wall M_____ F- ......
Public use of such "obscene language to attract attention to
a constitutionally protected message" was not beyond state control. The leaflets gave notice
of a planned "teach-in" and carried a message that objected to the Vietnam War. In Gain
v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 769, 775 (Ky. 1969), reversed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Mar.
24, 1970), the court suggested that when a tribunal must decide if challenged material is
immune from government regulation it asks: "Is it beneficial?" rather than, "Is it harmful?"
The Cain court added: "Certainly no benefit can come to any individual or any society by
the use or dissemination of pornographic and obscene material." In dissent, a jurist pointed
to what he saw as "the duty of the state to protect the local moral fabric of its people
through its police power .... Freedom of speech we should and must have but it is not
a right to be obscene." Id. McCauley v. "Tropic of Cancer," 20 Wis. 2d 134, 151, 121 N.W.2d
545, 558 (1963). In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of the State
of New York, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), the Court found unconstitutional a state's denial of a
license to display a film on the ground that it presented adultery in a desirable light. The
Court refused to find that a state possessed power to purge ideas with which it may
disagree.
10. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
11. Id. at 509. The majority, reflecting the Court's finely tuned sensitivity to restraints
on speech and press pointed out that a statute that limited "freedom of expression" violated "an accused's right" not only "under procedural due process" but also one's right to
"freedom of speech and press . . . . [A] statute limiting freedom of expression" must "give
fair notice of what acts will be punished." The blending of due process and the first
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The section of the New York Penal Law before the Court made it a misdemeanor to possess, with the intent to sell, magazines that included "accounts2
of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime.""
As construed by the highest state court, the act forbade "the massing of
stories of bloodshed and lust in such a way as to incite crime against the
person."
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion was consistent with Chaplinsky.
He spoke of the respect that must be paid to state legislative decisions in
the handling of crime and its prevention. Since the state's action was neither
reckless nor unreasonable, it was immune from federal judicial attack. The
Court could not, under the "fundamental fairness" formula prescribed by
3
the Due Process Clause, second-guess the state on such matters.1
The Court, however found that the act "did not limit punishment to the
indecent and obscene" as formerly understood. The state had created a new
crime but had failed to give "effective notice of new crime" as required by
due process. This defect was not cured by the construction of the statute by
the state's highest court. Significantly, the Court rejected Murphy's emphasis
on the protection of morality and order. The fourteenth amendment was
not limited to the protection of the "exposition of ideas." Justice Reed
wrote:' 4
The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive
for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing of any
possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much entitled
to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.
The first sentence of the above quotation has been used repeatedly by
members of the Court in obscenity cases. The Court has not accepted,
however, what appears to have been Reed's belief that the dicta in Chaplinsky
was in fact the law. Alluding to state regulation of printed matter, he

amendment is consistent with the Court's view that freedom of speech and press are "pre-

ferred rights" under the Constitution. For a discussion of the early evolution of the
"preferred position" concept see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-93 (1949) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
12. N.Y. PENAL LAW §1141 (McKinney 1944).
13. By invoking the "fundamental fairness" doctrine Frankfurter chose to adapt the
thinking found in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 819, 328 (1937), to the law of obscenity.
In Palko the Court refused to find that the fourteenth amendment included all the

guarantees found in the original Bill of Rights. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court,
found that the amendment decreed a standard of "ordered liberty" for state action rather
than a table of particulars against which to measure the constitutionality of state behavior.
Under a test of "ordered liberty," when state action was challenged, the Court would ask in
regard to the state's behavior: "Does it violate those 'fundamental prindples of liberty and

justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'?" In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the Supreme Court overruled Palko. The impact of Benton on
the law of obscenity is considered in note 99 infra.

14. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
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declared: "They are equally subject to control if they are lewd, indecent,
obscene or profane."'1
In Beauharnais v. Illinois16 the Supreme Court specifically analyzed the
power of government to deal with obscenity. The Court refused to set aside
a conviction under a state statute that, in part, prohibited the offering for
sale, or the exhibiting in a public place of "any lithograph . . . which
publication . . . portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity or lack of virtue
of a class of citizens, of any race, color ... which said publication or exposition exposes the citizens of any race, color . . . to contempt, derision, or
obloquy .... .. 17

The accused was found guilty of having exhibited in a public place a
publication that portrayed "depravity, criminality, unchastity or lack of
virture of citizens of Negro race and color and which exposes [sic] citizens of
Illinois of the Negro race and color to contempt, derision, or obloquy ....
."8
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, reiterated the proposition
voiced in Chaplinsky that certain forms of speech are of such little value
that constitutionally they may be barred. He viewed the statute as an outgrowth of legitimate state concern because past tensions between blacks and
whites in Illinois had led to violence and destruction. Due process does not,
said Frankfurter, require a state crimnal statute to be struck down unless
it is established that it embodies a scientifically correct solution. 12' States may
experiment with and adopt means that are subsequently proved erroneous.
Since states are entrusted with broad power to deal with local crimes, the
federal judiciary may not substitute its judgment for that of a state legislature
so long as the penal law in question is rational and fundamentally fair.
The Court again took the position that obscenity is not "within the area
of constitutionally protected speech." Accordingly, asserted Frankfurter, "it
is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to consider the issues
behind the phrase 'clear and present danger' " when dealing with obscene
material.2 ° Subject to but one recently announced exception, the principle
that the "clear and present danger" test has no place in the law of obscenity
1
retains the support of a majority of the Court.

15.
16.

Id.
343 U.S. 250 (1952).
17. Id. at 251, quoting 38 ILL. REy. STAT. §471 (1949).
18. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1952).
19. Courts when deciding whether legislation is to be struck down, in general invoke
a test of reasonableness. Commonwealth v. Leis, 243 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1969) (the court
rejected a challenge to a state law outlawing the possession of marijuana). In Bookcase, Inc.
v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1966), the court respected a
legislative determination that certain kinds of literature might contribute to juvenile crime
and impair the moral and ethical development of the young.
20. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
21. See text accompanying notes 88-92 infra. Those members of the Court who insist
that a "clear and present danger" test be employed to test the validity of governmental
control of obscenity cite as authority Supreme Court decisions dealing with government
curbs on speech and press in areas invariably involving unpopular political-economic philosophies. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
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Justice Jackson, dissenting separately, expressed a number of constitutional standards that, in various forms, continue to be voiced by some
members of the Court. He contended that the fourteenth amendment does
not place the same kind of restriction on state action as the first amendment
imposes on the federal government. The fourteenth amendment, in his
opinion, demands state compliance with a standard of "ordered liberty," but
with a major qualification; a state may curb speech only if the "clear and
present danger" standard is satisfied. Jackson saw no reason to treat obscene
speech differently from other speech. Even when dealing with obscenity
upon which a conviction is based the state has the burden of establishing
that the utterance constitutes a "clear and present danger to those substantive
evils which the legislature has a right to prevent." 22 Here, the trial court
had not applied the clear and present danger test.
Justice Jackson criticized the state court's refusal to admit evidence that
the accused claimed would have established the truth of his utterances. As
far as Jackson was concerned, rules of evidence do not fall beyond the
concern of the federal judiciary when reviewing state action involving a
restriction on speech or press. While Jackson questioned the defendant's
ability to prove the truth of his assertions, he condemned the state procedure
that denied him the opportunity to do so. Jackson's thinking was diametrically opposed to the position taken by Justice Murphy in Chaplinsky. There,
Murphy maintained that the kind of evidence a defendant could use in a
state proceeding, as well as the adequacy of the evidence necessary to sustain
a conviction in the area of speech, were "questions for the state court to
determine." At present, Justice Jackson's thinking in this regard more
closely resembles the thinking of the Court than does Murphy's.
Dissenting in Beauharnais,Justice Douglas assumed that the first amendment circumscribes state action in the same way it delimits the power of the
federal government. Speech and press enjoy a "preferred position" under
the first amendment. Eschewing a rule of reason, he read the Constitution as
guaranteeing speech and press an absolute freedom from the police power
of the state except in those instances in which the "clear and present danger"
test has been met. Alluding to Holmes' classic statement, Douglas acknowledged that government "might call a halt to inflammatory talk, such as
the shouting of 'fire' in a school or theatre." To be constitutionally permissible, a state's curb on speech must leave "no room for argument, raising
' 23
no doubts as to the necessity of curbing speech in order to prevent disaster."
On this occasion the state's restriction failed to pass muster. Justice Douglas
continues to abide by these same views almost two decades later, never
having indicated any second thoughts about his position in Beauharnais.
(1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919) (Justice Holmes' dissent, in which Justice Brandeis concurred); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). For a discussion of a "clear and present danger" test as a criterion of the constitutionality of government action, see Engdahl, Requiem for Roth: Obscenity Doctrine is Changing, 68 Micm. L. REv. 185 (1969).
22. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 299 (1952). (Jackson, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 285 (Douglas, J., dissenting). .
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According to Justice Black, the majority, by employing a "'rational
basis'" criterion, had downgraded the first amendment. In distinguishing
Chaplinsky he pointed out that there the Court was dealing with an individual's remarks vis-?t-vis another individual, in a public place, in a setting in
which a fight might have resulted. Here, defendant had distributed material
that was directed at a group. States may not, Black insisted, experiment
with curbs on "what opinions Americans can express." Illinois had undertaken "state censorship," and this a state may not do however beneficient its
motives might be. "I think," he wrote, "the First Amendment, with the Fourteenth, 'absolutely' forbids such laws without any 'ifs' or 'buts' or 'whereases.' "24 He looked askance at placing freedom of speech and press "at the
mercy of a case-by-case, day-by-day majority of this Court." He perceived a
far greater danger flowing from government regulation of speech and press
than from a milieu in which speech and press were completely free from
government control. Black, like Douglas, has never varied from his position
in Beauharnais.
In Chaplinsky, Winters, and Beauharnais, the Court failed to consider
the precise substantive rules of constitutional law that govern state and federal
regulation of obscenity. However, the thinking expressed in these cases did
serve as the point of departure for members of the Court when finally they
did speak out on the extent to which the Constitution prohibits federal and
state regulation of obscenity. Working in a peripheral area, the Court had
cast the die.
THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

From Roth to Redrup
The "Roth doctrine" originated in two companion cases that,
purpose of decisional format, were treated together. In Roth v.
States25 the Court sustained a federal obscenity statute; 26 in Alberts
28
fornia27 it sustained a state obscenity statute.
In Roth the Court held that "obscenity is not within the area
stitutionally protected speech or press." '29 Justice Brennan, speaking

for the
United
v. Caliof confor the

24. Id. at 276 (Black, J., dissenting).
25. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
26. In part, the statute declared "to 'be nonmailable' matter .... [e]very obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character." To "knowingly" deposit such matter "for mailing or
delivery" subjected one to a fine of "not more than $5,000 or imprisonment not more than
five years, or both."
27. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
28. The California statute made it a misdemeanor to "wilfully and lewdly" keep "for
sale... any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or books ...."
29. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). While the Court spoke about
obscenity, and affirmed both convictions, it did not decide that the material dealt with
by the defendants was obscene under the test it prescribed. In footnote 8 to his opinion,
Justice Brennan wrote: "No issue is presented in either case concerning the obscenity of
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Court, distinguished between obscenity and ideas. Obscenity is "utterly
without redeeming social importance." Ideas, on the other hand, regardless
of their merit or unorthodoxy, intrinsically possess some "redeeming social
importance." Brennan felt that the "clear and present danger" test did not
apply to obscene matter because obscenity "is not protected speech."
"[S]ex and obscenity are-not synonymous. Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest."30 Material
is obscene if (1) "to the average person," (2) "applying -contemporary community standards," (3) "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
31
appeals to prurient interest." '
Justice Brennan voiced concern with possible excesses of state and federal
regulation of speech and press. He cautioned that "ceaseless vigilance" is
essential "to prevent [the] erosion [of freedom of speech and press] by Con32
gress or by the States." In oft-repeated words he admonished:
The door barring federal and state intrusion into this area cannot be
left ajar; it must be kept tightly dosed and opened only the slightest
crack necessary to prevent encroachment upon most important interests. It is therefore vital that the standards for judging obscenity
safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for material
which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.
Chief Justice Warren, concurring separately, contended that the setting
in which a book is sold should influence a court's decision as to whether it
is obscene. He agreed that obscene material falls outside the pale of constitutionally protected speech or press and saw obscenity as a "social problem"
that, under particular circumstances, warranted state or federal action. Obthe material involved." However, while some members of the Court decided that a decision
need not be made as to the nature of the material, other members did choose to look
beyond the statute. Chief Justice Warren referred to the behavior of the defendants. Justice
Harlan insisted that to arrive at a result the Court had to examine the material and
decide if it was obscene. He asserted that he read the book involved in Alberts, having done
so to determine whether California had violated what he viewed as the constitutional limit
of state power. Similarly, in a dissenting opinion, written to apply to both Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 711 (1968), and Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968), Justice Harlan wrote: "Although the Court finds it unnecessary to pass
judgment upon the materials involved in these cases [having based its decision in each
case on the constitutionality of the statute, and no more] I consider it preferable to face
that question."
30. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). Justice Brennan, in footnote 20, set
forth a number of definitions of the word "prurient." Included were: "[M]aterial having
a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.... 'Itching; longing; uneasy with desire or longing;
of persons having itching, morbid, or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or propensity,
lewd....' He quoted from the Model Penal Code, §207.10 (2) Tent. Draft No. 6 (1957):
"'A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient
interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes
substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such
matters.'"
81. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). Justice Brennan did not number the
criteria. The numbers have been added.
32. Id. at 488.
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jecting to a constitutional standard tied to content, he spoke in favor of an
"environmental" test. In his opinion; "it is not the book that is on trial;
it is a person." It is "[t]he conduct of the defendant" that determines whether
government may constitutionally exercise its police power, rather than "the
obscenity of a book or picture." Warren contended that such a test presented
the least danger to the undesirable suppression of art, literature, and science.3
Certainly content is relevant, but only "as an attribute of the defendant's
conduct" rather than as a determinant of whether the material in question
is constitutionally protected. The "setting" in which an accused carries on
his activity should determine whether he was trafficking in obscene material.
Here, the Chief Justice found that the defendants "openly advertised to
appeal to the erotic interest of their customers. They were plainly engaged
in the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for
material with prurient effect." 34 Such conduct, declared Warren, can be
punished by the federal or state government acting within a sphere of constitutional competence. Ten years later this "environmental" approach gained
5
the limited approval of a majority of the Court.3
Justice Harlan concurred with the Court in Alberts, but voted for reversal
in Roth. When called upon to decide whether an accused has been denied
his freedom to speak or publish, an appellate court, in Harlan's opinion,
should not follow the traditional approach to the scope of appellate review.
Justice Brennan had employed a general definition of obscenity to determine
the lawfulness of government action. Under such an approach, appellate
review might be limited to a determination of whether the lower court or
courts had properly applied the prescribed test. Justice Harlan did not
believe that employment of a general definition of obscenity to test a lower
court decision satisfied the demands of the first and fourteenth amendments.
WNhen reviewing a lower court decision the Supreme Court has a "responsibility" to "determine for itself whether the attacked expression was 'suppress-

33. In Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 367 (1868), Chief Justice Cockburn, during
an exchange of comments with his fellow justices, spoke of an environmental or setting test,
commenting: "A medical treatise, with illustrations necessary for the information of those
whose education or information the work is intended, may, in a certain sense, be obscene,
and yet not the subject for indictment; but it can never be that these prints may be exhibited for any one, boys and girls, to see as they pass. The immunity must depend upon
the circumstances of the publication." In Hicklin the court ruled that a portion of a book
could render the entire work obscene and subject one to punishment under the terms of a
statute that prohibited the keeping of obscene books for sale. In Roth Justice Brennan
pointed out that he (lid not approve of the Hicklin approach, which, he wrote, permitted
material to be adjudged obscene "merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
34. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Warren, C.J. concurring).
35. See text accompanying notes 53-61 infra. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
referred to Chief Justice Warren's approach as a "variable approach to obscenity" rather
than a "setting" or "environmental" approach. Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc.,
427 Pa. 189, 233 A.2d 840 (1967). In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), the Supreme
Court spoke of "variable obscenity" to describe a standard that permitted a legislature to set
one standard for adults and another for juveniles.
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able.' ,36 Each case must be decided on an individual basis, for whether
material is obscene "involves not really an issue of fact but a question of
constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind."37 Jurors
are not to be treated as the final arbiters on the question of obscenity. In
each instance the response to the question is a matter of fact for "independent" judicial determination. Judges are obliged to personally scrutinize the
challenged material and then independently decide if it is obscene. Under
Harlan's test lower court determinations on the issue of whether material
is obscene, whether made by jury or judge, go for naughtl
Refusing to find that the first amendment, in its pristine form, applied
to state action, Harlan invoked the Palko "ordered liberty" test to decide
the constitutionality of the state statute and the conviction of the accused.
In the vein of Chaplinsky, Winters, and Beauharnais he acceded to the
competence of California to deal with "sexual morality." While one might
question the validity of the state's approach as found in the statute under
which Alberts had been convicted, the state's action was not so inconsistent
with the demands of "ordered liberty" that the statute ran afoul of due
process. Having read the challenged material, Justice Harlan found "its
suppression would [not] so interfere with the communication of 'ideas' in
'3 8
any proper sense of that term that it would offend the Due Process Clause."
Justice Harlan believed that the federal statute under which Roth was
convicted had to be tested in terms of (1) the first amendment; (2) the
extent of federal interest in sexual morality; and (3) the danger of a single
uniform standard of censorship. Harlan classified congressional interest in
sexual moraliy as "attenuated." A nationwide rule of censorship presented
a far greater danger than state censorship laws. Material outlawed in one
state might not be outlawed in another. In Harlan's opinion the federal power
allowed Congress to deal only with "'hard-core' pornography." Federal regulation of material that might do nothing more than stir up "'thoughts'" was
barred by the first amendment. The statute as construed by the majority was
unconstitutional since it could be applied to other than "'hard-core' pornography." In part, Harlan attributed his narrow approach to the federal power
to the consequences that could flow from federal action. While the federal
government could impose a single "blanket ban" across the entire nation,
individual states are limited geographically and might espouse different attitudes toward the treatment of sex. 39

86. Roth v. United States, 854 U.S. 476, 497 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 498.
38. Id. at 503.
89. At times state courts, deciding whether a book is obscene, have arrived at different
results when ruling on the same book. In People v. Fritch, 18 N.Y.2d 119, 124, 192 N.E.2d
713, 717, 248 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (1963), Tropic of Cancer was found to be obscene, "'hard-core
pornography,' dirt for dirt's sake." A like result was arrived at in Grove Press, Inc. v.
Gerstein, 156 So. 2d 587 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), reversed, 878 U.S. 577 (1964). In Larkin v.
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 899, 200 N.E.2d 760, 252 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1964), the same court
that handed down People v. Fritch concluded that Fritch had been overruled by the
Supreme Court's decision in Grove Press, Inc. v. Gerstein. The Supreme Court of California
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In dissenting, Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black concurred, viewed
the first amendment as proscribing both federal and state action. The
amendment's command is absolute: speech and press are free from government control. All forms of censorship, regardless of motive or purpose,
regardless of whether the challenged utterance deals with religion, philosophy,
politics, economics, or sex, are unconstitutional. Spurning the principle that
obscenity lies outside first amendment protection, Douglas argued that the
Constitution does not permit government to evaluate the "'redeeming social
importance'" of any ideas. Thoughts alone, or the arousal of thoughts, cannot
be punished. In advocating a stringent "clear and present danger" standard,
Douglas wrote: "Freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the
extent that, it is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be an inseparable
°
part of it."4
In 1966 the Court reworked Roth to the extent that the newly formulated
standard appears to be a kind of Catch 22 definition of obscenity. However,
the initial pronouncement approved by a majority of the Court in Roth is
still not without support. Regardless of the definition used, obscenity, according to most of the Court, is not protected by the first and fourteenth amendments. Roth has been refashioned to include, under some circumstances, the
thinking Chief Justice Warren and Justice Harlan expressed in their dissenting opinions in Roth. Justices Douglas and Black continue to stand alone
in support of a constitutional principle that the first and fourteenth amendments protect all utterances, obscene or otherwise, unless the demands of a
clear and present danger test are satisfied.
In Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day,4 1 as in Roth, the Court focused on
the breadth of the federal power to deal with obscenity. 2 Justice Harlan
insisted that Roth did not stand for the proposition that a publication that
appeals to the prurient interest could, if it met the other two demands of Roth,
be treated as obscene. Roth required something more. If material were
to be classified as obscene under the first amendment it not only had to appeal
predominantly to prurient interest, but it also must be "patently offensive"
or "indecent." justice Harlan treated this latter requisite as interchangeable
with the phrase: "[I]t goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
describing or representing such matters." 43 To be obscene in the constitutional sense material had to be "offensive on . . . [its] face."

Since a federal statute was involved, absent any contrary directive and
without deciding if Congress could in fact decree a narrower geographic area,
Harlan concluded that under Roth the "relevant 'community'" was the
in Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963) and the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in McCauley v. "Tropic of Cancer," 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121
N.W.2d 545 (1963), each decided that Tropic of Cancer was not obscene.
40. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 514 (1957) (Douglas, J., dissenting).

41.

370 U.S. 478 (1962).

42. Here, as in Roth, the defendant was accused of having violated 18 U.S.C. §1461
(1964). See note 18 supra. In part, certiorari was granted to consider the petitioner's claim
that Roth had not been correctly interpreted and applied by the district court and the
court of appeals.
43. Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 486 (1962).
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nation. Without deciding "[w]hether 'hard-core' pornography, or something
less . . . [was] the proper test" of obscene versus nonobscene. Harlan found
that the magazines in question "taken as a whole . . . [did not go] beyond
the pale of contemporary notions of rudimentary decency."4' In his opinion,
neither the "sordid motives" of the publisher nor the "dismally unpleasant,
uncouth, and tawdry" nature of their content rendered them obscene. Roth,
said Harlan, was intended "to tighten obscenity standards." The door to
government control, under Roth, was to be opened "'only the slightest crack
necessary to prevent encroachment upon more important interests.'"
Justice Harlan's view that Roth prohibits regulation of speech or press
unless the material dealt with is "patently offensive on its face" has become
an intricate part of the Roth doctrine. Similarly, there has been some Court
support for the proposition that when the propriety of federal or state action
is under scrutiny, the "community" mentioned in Roth is, as Harlan suggested, national in scope.
In Jacobellis v. Ohio4 Justice Stewart noted the difficulty in elucidating
just what is meant by "obscene." He invoked a narrow intuitive test suggesting that perhaps obscene was "undefinable." "Criminal laws" in his
opinion "are constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography." 46 Only by

44. Id. at 489.
45. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
46. In a footnote Justice Stewart referred to People v. Richmond County News, Inc.,
9 N.Y2d 578, 587, 175 N.E.2d 681, 686, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369, 876 (1961), suggesting that the
definition used by that court could serve as a statement of what he meant by the term
"hard-core pornography." In Richmond County News, Inc. the court described pornographic
material as follows: "It focuses predominantly upon what is sexually morbid, grossly
perverse and bizarre, without any artistic or scientific purpose or justification. Recogit is to be
nizable 'by the insult it offers, invariably, to sex, and to the human spirit' ...
differentiated from the bawdy and the ribald. Depicting dirt for dirt's sake, the obscene is
the vile, rather than the coarse, the blow to sense, not merely to sensibility. It smacks, at
times, of fantasy and unreality, of sexual perversion and sickness and represents, according
to one thoughtful scholar, 'a debauchery of the sexual faculty."' This court used the terms
"obscene" and "pornographic" interchangeably, but it did not use the term "hard-core
pornography."
In a dissenting opinion in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 (1966), Justice
Stewart wrote: "In order to prevent any possible misunderstanding, I have set out in the
margin a description, borrowed from the Solicitor General's brief, of the kind of things
to which I have reference [when speaking of hard-core pornography]." "'Such materials
include photographs, both still and motion picture, with no pretense of artistic value,
graphically depicting acts of sexual intercourse, including various' acts of sodomy and
sadism, and sometimes involving several participants in scenes of orgy-like character. They
also include strips of drawings in comic-book format grossly depicting similar activities in
an exaggerated fashion. There are, in addition, pamphlets and booklets, sometimes with
photographic illustrations, verbally describing such activities in a bizarre manner with
no attempt whatsoever to afford portrayals of character or situation and with no pretense
to literary value. All of this material . . . cannot conceivably be characterized as embodying communication of ideas or artistic values inviolate under the First Amendment
. " (emphasis added).
In People v. Pinkus, 256 Cal. App. 2d 941, 63 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1967), the court, having
viewed what it called a "'stag party' type film," affirmed a conviction under a state obscenity
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examining the material does one know whether challenged material meets
this test. In holding the state action unconstitutional he wrote: "But I know
it when I see it [hard-core pornography], and the motion picture involved in
4 7
this case is not that."

Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Goldberg concurred, adhered to Roth
and declined to follow on "hard-core pornography - have a look, examine,
and see" test. As he read Roth, obscenity fell beyond constitutional protection
because " 'it is utterly without redeeming social importance.'" In light of
what was to follow, special note must be taken of Brennan's "utterly without"
approach, under which material is shielded by the Constitution from government interference only if it is found to be "utterly without redeeming social
importance." Thus, material dealing with sex that would not ordinarily be
protected can acquire immunity if, in addition to its obscene treatment of
sex, it also contains material that advocates ideas or has "literary or scientific
or artistic value or any other form of social importance. ' ' 48 Brennan felt that
the "bad" portions of the material should not be balanced against the "good"
and thereby subject the entire work to government control. According to
Brennan, "the constitutional status of the material [may not be] made to
turn on a 'weighing' of its social importance against its prurient appeal, for
a work cannot be proscribed unless it is 'utterly' without social importance." 49

According to Brennan, the "contemporary community" standard adopted in
Roth might vary from time to time.5o Geographically, it was a national
rather than a local standard.
Justice Brennan shunned a "sufficient evidence" test that would ordinarily
preclude factfinding on the Supreme Court level. Rather than treat obscenity
as a fact question, Brennan believed it the duty of every Court member to

statute. It categorized the film as "'hard-core

pornography'"

using the same type of

standard alluded to by Justice Stewart. In City of Youngstown v. DeLoreto, 19 Ohio App.

2d 267, 275, 251 N.E.2d 491, 498, 48 Ohio Op. 2d 393, 401 (1969) the court likewise utilized
Justice Stewart's view of what constituted "hard-core pornography." Distinguishing it from
art, the court said: "True art conveys a thought, a speculation, or a perception about the
human condition. Pornography is pictures of sex organs and their usage devoid of all
other meaning-the personality having no place. They bear in upon one in a sense of

increasing ugliness and degradation of the human being. Pornography is not art, no matter
how pretty the colors."
47. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963).

48. Id. at 191 (Brennan, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 191.
50. Id. at 193. In Commonwealth v. Baer, 209 Pa. Super. 349, 355, 227 A.2d 915, 919
(1967), the court, speaking of the "fluid standard" used to test whether material is constitutionally protected, wrote: "Mid-Victorian mores or even the morality and understanding of a generation ago are inappropriate guidelines to the limits of protected expression
today. It may be, as some have suggested, that our modern sensibilities have been blunted
by the massive emphasis of sexually provocative material on television and in the cinema
.... Such, whether we approve or disapprove, is the temper of our times .... [referring
to the publications in issue, the court continued] Vulgar and tawdry they may be, but so
is much in our society. Since '[t]he community cannot, where liberty of speech and press
are at issue, condemn that which it generally tolerates' . . . appellants' convictions cannot
stand."
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examine the material personally. In his judgment the state had improperly
classified the challenged film as obscene.
As in prior and subsequent cases, Justices Black and Douglas sternly
opposed government participation in censorship. Fiery exception was taken
to a constitutional standard that made the Supreme Court, in Black's words,
a "'Supreme Board of Censors.'"
Justice Harlan accepted, as a constitutional principle in the sensitive areas
of speech and press, his judicial duty to determine independently whether
challenged material was obscene. He reiterated his belief that under the
fourteenth amendment a state has a far broader latitude to deal with speech
and press than Congress has under the first amendment. The test ordained
by the fourteenth amendment is one of rationality. Justice Harlan believed
the Court should not disturb a state result based upon "rationally established
criteria for judgment of such material." As did Justice Stewart, Harlan
lectured on the difficulty of verbalizing what is obscene, indicating that, in
the last analysis, how material is categorized depends on how it "happens
to strike the minds ...of a majority of the Court." Having viewed the film,
Harlan found that the state's action did not violate the fourteenth amendment.
Chief Justice Warren, in dissent, expressed support of Roth, but read it
as establishing a "rule of reason." When it alluded to "community," Roth
referred to a local rather than to a national standard. 51 As in his separate
opinion in Roth, Warren argued in favor of an "environmental" test linking
the Court's decision to the intended use of the material. If it were intended
for literary, scientific, or artistic purposes the material is immune from government control. If it were concocted to treat sex in a manner calculated
to reap profit, the material may be treated as nothing more than smut, falling
outside the pale of constitutional protection.
So long as the lower federal or state courts afforded procedural due
process and invoked Roth as he understood it, Warren contended that the
only issue to be decided by the Supreme Court was "whether there is sufficient
evidence in the record upon which a finding of obscenity could be made."
Warren termed "sufficient evidence" to mean more than a "mere modicum
51. Jacovellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1963) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). In State v.
Childs, 447 P.2d 304 (Ore. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 931 (1969), the court approved of
an approach to "community" that was synonymous with the nation. In In re Giannini, 69
Cal. 2d 208, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968); McCauley v ."Tropic of Cancer," 20
Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963); City of Youngstown v. DeLoreto, 19 Ohio App. 2d 267,
251 N.E.2d 491, 48 Ohio Op. 2d 393 (1969), the court saw the relevant community as the
state. In Olsen v. Doerfler, 14 Mich. App. 428, 165 N.W.2d 648 (1969), the court approved
of community in terms of the county in which the case was tried. In Nissinoff v. Harper,
221 So. 2d 747 (1st D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 221 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1968), the word "community" was thought of as the views of the people who resided at the place where the case
was tried. In Cain v. Commonwealth, 437 S. W. 2d 769, 773 (Ky. 1969), reversed sub nom.,
Cain v. Kentucky, 397 U.S. 319 (1970), the court approving of the trial court's refusal to
allow an expert from New York to testify as to his opinion about the film in question,
wrote: "It was inconceivable that he could have a better opinion of the community standards
of Louisville, Kentucky, than the twelve jurors sworn to try the case."
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of evidence . . . something more than merely any evidence but something

less than 'substantial evidence on the record [including the allegedly obscene
material] as a whole.' 52 The Chief Justice disapproved of Supreme Court
jurists sitting as censors, deciding anew the obscenity issue in each case. He
found in Jacobellis that the state courts had not acted without sufficient
evidence in ruling the film, intended to be used for commercial purposes,
obscene.
Justice Goldberg, in a concurring opinion, remarked that the exhibitors
of the film could not be "criminally prosecuted unless the exaggerated
character of the advertising rather than the obscenity of the film is to be
the constitutional criterion." Two years later the Court, in Ginzburg v.
United States,53 took cognizance of the context in which material was disseminated in deciding if it could be ruled obscene. The Court in Ginzburg,
as well as in Mishkin v. New York5 4 heeded Warren's call for an environment
test.
In Ginzburg Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, ruled that under
Roth material might be condemned as obscene under federal law even though
it might otherwise be constitutionally protected, if the seller had advertised
the material in a fashion calculated to arouse the prurient interest of prospective customers. In Brennan's opinion " 'if the object [of a work] is material
gain for the creator through an appeal to the sexual curiosity and appetite,'
the work is pornographic." 55 He quoted with approval from Chief Justice
W~arren's separate opinion in Roth wherein Warren articulated a setting
standard. Brennan cautioned that the Court did not consider the making
of profit to be a relevant factor. What is relevant under Roth is the issue
of pandering. He summed up the majority's position as follows: 56
Where an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography is
shown with respect to material lending itself to such exploitation
through pervasive treatment or description of sexual matters, such
evidence may support the determination that the material is obscene
even though in other contexts the material would escape such
condemnation.
52. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202-03 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). In the
following cases state courts opted for the "sufficient evidence" test: Nissinoff v. Harper, 221
So. 2d 747 (lst D.C.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 221 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 1968); Felton v. City of
Pensacola, 200 So. 2d 842 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1967). In Jones v. City of Birmingham, 224 So.
2d 922, 924 (Ala. 1969), the appellate court saw its function as more narrow than the
standard of Chief Justice Warren. "[T]he sufficiency of the evidence is not within the scope
of appellate review ....
Whether or not that conduct conveyed any idea of redeeming
social importance was a question of fact." The conduct in question was "topless dancing."
In McCauley v. "Tropic of Cancer," 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963), a dissenting
judge voted to affirm the trial court since its result was "not against the great weight and
clear preponderance of the evidence."
53. 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
54. 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
55. Ginzberg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 471 (1966).
56. Id. at 476. Here, as in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), the
Court granted certiorari to decide if the trial court properly interpreted and applied "the
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Four members of the Court dissented. Justice -Stewart objected that the
Court had gone beyond Roth and Justice Harlan's assertion in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day that material had to be patently indecent in order to be
subject to government regulation. He insisted that under Roth nothing less
than hard-core pornography could be outlawed. Since the material in question did not fall within this category, it was constitutionally protected. Justice
Harlan took issue with the majority's willingness to consider the conduct,
attitude, and motives of a defendant in deciding whether he had mailed
obscene material. According to Harlan, the federal statute condemned the
mailing of obscene material and not the marketing technique used by an
accused. The federal government, under the Constitution, could bar from
the mails nothing less than hard-core pornography. Not having dealt with
such material the accused could not be punished. Justice Douglas reiterated
his belief that the first amendment did not proclaim a rule of reason. Rather,
it barred "all regulation or control of expression." He took issue with a
test tied to "an advertising technique as old as history." Besides specifically
taking issue with the standard utilized by the Court, Justice Black denied
that government possessed power to regulate the expression of ideas or views
not inescapably enmeshed with conduct.
Speaking for the Court in Mishkin Justice Brennan applied the pandering
principle to affirm a conviction under a state criminal statute. The statute
prohibited the publication and sale of obscene material as well as the hiring
of persons to prepare such material. Under state law "obscene was synonymous with hard-core pornography," which, Justice Brennan pointed out, "is
more stringent than the Roth definition" of obscenity. 57 The defendant had
employed persons to prepare the challenged materials that he sold in his
bookstore, and had told such persons: "'T]he sex scenes had to be very
strong, it had to be rough . . . [and] dearly spelled out.'"

He directed the

employees to make the sex scenes "'unusual sex scenes between men and
women, and women and women, and men and men,'" to deal with "'sex in
an abnormal and irregular fashion.' "58 In Brennan's opinion the accused's
own evaluation of the material, under Ginzburg, was to be considered in
deciding whether the material was constitutionally protected. Striking out
at what he clearly regarded as distasteful commercial exploitation of sex by
the defendant, Brennan described the finished books as "cheaply prepared
paperbound 'pulps'" that had a sales price "several thousand percent above
costs."
Justice Brennan disregarded the contention that since some of the books
depicted "deviant sexual practices, such as flagellation, fetishism, and lesbianism" they were constitutionally protected under Roth. The appellant argued
that the state had not satisfied Roth because such books "do not appeal to
a prurient interest of the 'average person' in sex, that 'instead of stimulating
standards ... first enunciated in Roth ....
".Asin Roth, the defendant was charged
with violating 18 U.S.C. §1461 (1964).
57. Mishkin v. New York, 883U.S. 502, 508 (1966). Brennan cited People v. Richmond
County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d 681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961).
58. Mishkin v. New York, .,83 U.S. 502, 505 (1966).
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the erotic, they disgust and sicken.' " Brennan interpreted Roth as authorizing the outlawing of material directed at "the sexual interests of its intended
and probable recipient group."'59 He cautioned, however, that for the purposes of Roth the word "group" must be defined in more specific terms than
"sexually immature persons." He pointed out that defendant had not made
a "substantial claim . . . that the books . . . [which depicted] deviant practices

are devoid of prurient appeal to sexually deviant groups."
6
the new graft on Roth: 0

He summed up

59. Id. at 509. The Supreme Court has not interpreted the first and fourteenth amendments as proclaiming distinct treatment for homosexualism, lesbianism, or various forms
of hetrosexual human relationships. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), wherein
the Court, if it chose, could have explored the advisability of employing different standards
for different types of sexual relationships.
60. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508 (1966). Justice Brennan pointed out that
there was proof, in addition to the accused's own evaluation of his material, that "the
books' prurient appeal" did in fact satisfy Roth so far as it was directed at "a clearly defined deviant sexual group." Id. He cited United States v. Klaw, 350 F.2d 155, 166 (2d Cir.
1965). In Klaw the court asserted that when the prosecution charges that material is obscene,
not because of its purported prurient appeal to the average person but because of its
prurient appeal to a "deviant segment of society whose reactions are hardly a matter of
common knowledge," expert evidence in the record is necessary to sustain a conviction.
The court noted that while particular stimuli might stir deviants a court might not take
judicial notice that such stimuli are obscene. "'[O]bviously, the issue of what stirs the
lust of the sexual deviate requires evidence of special competence.'"
Courts have differed as to the need of the prosecution to offer expert evidence when it
claims that material is obscene because it appeals to the prurient interest of the average
man. "Since the film speaks for itself and screams out for all to hear that it is obscene, no
expert testimony was needed to enable the trial judge to properly conclude that it met
the three-fold constitutional test of obscenity established by the Supreme Court." Lancaster
v. State, 256 A.2d 716, 720 (Md. 1969). But see Dunn v. Maryland State Board of Censors,
240 Md. 249, 213 A.2d 751 (1965). In State v. Childs, 447 P.2d 304 (Ore. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 931 (1969), the court rejected the argument that the Constitution requires in every
case expert testimony "with respect to each element of obscenity." In People v. Pinkus, 256
Cal. 2d 941, 63 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1967), the court found that: "None of the three films is
so esoteric that expert opinion evidence is necessary to interpret it to the average juror."
Id. at 684. In Pinkus the court ruled that an accused does not have a constitutional right
to offer oral expert testimony to refute a charge that the material he dealt with was obscene.
Justice Harlan in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 172 (1959), in a separate opinion,
asserted: "However, I would not hold that any particular kind of evidence must be admitted,
specifically, that the Constitution requires that oral opinion testimony by experts be heard."
While he would not say that oral expert testimony offered by a defendant on his behalf
must be admitted, being "constitutionally compelled," Harlan did assert that a state "is
not privileged to rebuff all efforts to enlighten or persuade the trier." Id. at 172. Compare
Landau v. Fording, 245 Cal. 2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1966), afl'd, 388 U.S. 456 (1967). In
Cain v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 769 (Ky. 1969), reversed sub nom., Cain v. Kentucky, 397
U.S. 319 (1970), the court rejected the contention that the trial court had been in error to
exclude "expert opinion testimony" offered by the defendant. In Attorney General v. A Book
Named "Naked Lunch," 351 Mass. 298, 299, 218 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1966), the nmajority was of
the opinion that the defendant might offer expert testimony in his defense. While the
appellate court was not bound, the jurists could not simply "ignore serious acceptance of
. . . [the book in question] by so many persons in the literary community." A dissenting
jurist, calling the book "literary sewage," remarked: "Our experience with allegedly pornographic works over the years here in Massachusetts has revealed that there is no dearth of
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Where the material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a
dearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at large,
the prurient-appeal requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest in sex of the members of that group.
Justice Black again dissenting, insisted that the Court was "without
constitutional power to censor speech or press regardless of the particular
subject discussed." He stated he did not read the challenged material in this
case or in Ginzburg. Even if "censorship of views about sex or any other
subject" was constitutional, he opposed saddling the Court with the "irksome
*..and unwholesome task of finally deciding by a case-by-case, sight-by-sight
personal judgment of the members of the Court what pornography (whatever that means) is too hard core for people to see or read." If such power
must be vested in government, he suggested it "be vested in some govern61
mental institution or institutions other than this Court."
On the same day the Court announced Ginzburg and Mishkin it handed
down A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General.62 In Memoirs a state court decision adjudging Fanny Hill
obscene was reversed. Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Fortas, concluded that the state court had erroneously applied the social
value criterion contained in Roth. The state supreme judicial court had
stated it did not interpret the social importance test as requiring that a book
which appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive must be "'unqualifiedly worthless before it can be deemed obscene.' "63 Brennan disagreed,
pointing out that under Roth all "three elements must coalesce":64
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without
redeeming social value ... even though the book is found to possess
the requisite prurient appeal and to be patently offensive. Each of
the three federal criteria is to be applied independently; the social
value of the book can neither be weighed against nor canceled by its
prurient appeal or patent offensiveness.
Justice Brennan asserted the reversal did not hold that the book could
not, under any circumstances, be classified as obscene. The result might be
different if it were established "that the book wds commercially exploited
for the sake of its prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other values . .. ."
Under such circumstances one could conclude "that the book was utterly
without redeeming social importance." This construction of Roth, in
Brennan's opinion, did not eliminate the utterly devoid of social value criterion. But, when a seller's "sole emphasis- is on the sexually provocative
aspects of his publication, a court could accept his evaluation at its face
experts ready to leap to the defence [sic] of such of them as have come under scrutiny from

time to time." Id.
61.

Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 516-17 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).

62. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
63. Id. at 419.
64. Id. at 419.
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value."
In this instance the trial court had not been pressed to explore
the circumstances under which it was produced and marketed.
In dissenting, Justice Clark displayed deep displeasure with "the continuous flow of pornographic material reaching" the Court "and the increasing problem States have in controlling it." He said Fanny Hill was "too
much even for me." 66 To him, Roth did not isolate an " 'utterly without
redeeming social value' test" as "a separate and distinct test." He insisted that
Roth had but "two constitutional requirements: (1) the book must be
judged as a whole, not by its parts, and (2) it must be judged in terms of
its appeal to the prurient interest of the average person, applying contemporary community standards.."6 7 Clark found that the book's "repeated
and unrelieved appeals to the prurient interest of the average person leaves
it utterly without redeeming social importance." He concluded that the
publisher had "published this obscenity -preying upon prurient and carnal
proclivities for its own pecuniary advantage." As to the scope of appellate
review, Clark approved of the sufficient evidence test voiced in Chief Justice
Warren's dissent in Jacobellis.
Justice Harlan, dissenting, alluded to the lack of agreement that continued
to plague the Court. "Two Justices believe the First and Fourteenth Amendments absolutely protect obscene and nonobscene material alike," while one
"believes that neither the States nor the Federal Government may suppress
any material save for 'hard-core pornography.' " As he read Roth it "stressed
prurience and utter lack of redeeming social importance." As a result of
Ginzburg and Mishkin, Roth had undergone a significant transformation:
pandering was added to a test of obscenity. "Patent offensiveness" was likewise an addition to Roth. "Given this tangled state of affairs," wrote Harlan,
he felt "free to adhere to the principles" he first set forth in his separate
opinion in Roth. Consequently, Congress, under the first amendment, might
not ban Fanny Hill from the mails. However, under the fourteenth amendment a state might treat Fanny Hill as obscene. Justice Harlan wrote:6 8
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment requires of a State only that it apply
criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of obscenity and that
it reach results not wholly out of step with current American standards.
As to criteria, it should be adequate if the court or jury considers such
elements as offensiveness, pruriency, social value, and the like.

65.

Id. at 420 (Clark, J., dissenting).

66. Id. at 441. When deciding, as a matter of law or constitutional judgment, that a
book, photograph, drawing, or film is obscene, courts insist that the judges refrain from
abiding by a personal or subjective test. Repeatedly, judges insist they have put aside
their personal views and arrived at their decision by objectively applying the described
frame of reference. See People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 578, 175 N.E.2d
681, 216 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1961), and Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427 Pa. 189,
233 A.2d 840 (1967). In United States v. Motion Picture Film Entitled "491," 367 F.2d 889 (2d
Cir. 1966), the court cautioned that judges do not possess "dictatorial powers" to suppress
material that they find personally objectionable.
67. "Memoirs" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 442 (1966) (Clark, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 458 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Justice Harlan believed the Supreme Court should administer this standard
on a case-by-case basis. He did not favor a standard that would permit
the testimony of experts to be controlling nor, apparently, did he approve
of a sufficient evidence standard.
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice White objected to elevating the
"utterly without redeeming social importance" concept found in Roth to a
distinct criterion status. He thought Roth permitted regulation of obscene
material "because it is inherently and utterly without social value," and that
it ordained a test tied to a book's predominant theme, not to one that was
keyed to "minor themes of a different nature." White viewed as improper
the designation of social importance as an independent test of obscenity.
As he read Roth "'social importance' . . . is relevant only to determining
the predominant prurient interest of the material, a determination which
the court or the jury will make based on the material itself and all the evidence in the case, expert or otherwise." 69 White quoted from that portion of
Roth that drew upon Chaplinsky: it had never been thought that the lewd
and obscene raised any constitutional problem. Under Roth, he wrote,
"legislatures, courts, and juries" are free to exercise their judgment, but not
in an unrestricted fashion. While he did not use the term "rule of reason"
there can be little if any doubt that White favored a rule of reason. In his
opinion a state was free to treat Fanny Hill as obscene and to forbid its sale.
From Redrup to Stanley
Redrup v. New York 70 was but one of three cases announced simultaneously. Each raised a question of state power. In two, the defendants assailed
criminal convictions, while in the other the appellant appealed from a civil
judgment that ordered destruction of magazines he held for sale. In the
course of reversing all three cases the Court announced two new categories
of permissible state action. One was based on the unique power of a state
to control the bahavior of young people; the other reflected the Court's
concern with the invasion of privacy. The Justices made a succinct onesentence statement abouteach principle, expanding at length upon neither.
Each statement was followed by a citation of two authorities.
In expressing the first principle, the Court, citing as authority Prince v.
Massachusetts-' and Butler v. Michigan,72 said: "In none of the cases was
there a claim that the statute in question reflected a specific and limited state
concern for juveniles." In Prince, a divided Supreme Court sustained a state
penal law that prohibited boys under twelve years and girls under eighteen
years from offering to sell newspapers, magazines, or periodicals in a public
place, as well as prohibiting one from furnishing such material with the
knowledge that the minor would engage in the prohibited conduct. The
69. Id. at 462 (White, J., dissenting).
70. 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
71. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
72. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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statute further barred a parent or guardian from compelling or permitting
a minor to engage in such activity. The defendant, a guardian of a nineyear-old girl, allowed the youngster publicly to offer for sale religious
material that the defendant had obtained and offered for sale. The defendant
claimed her conviction violated the fourteenth amendment on the grounds
that it denied her religious liberty and parental rights.
Writing for the Court, Justice Rutledge asserted that protecting the
welfare of children is a societal interest. Society could ensure "that children
[are to] be both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth
into free and independent well developed men and citizens. ' ' 7 3 He insisted
that rights of religion and parenthood are not "beyond limitation . . . the

state as parens patriae" could act "to guard the general interest in youth's
well being." The Court distinguished between state regulation of adult
behavior and the behavior of children, stating: "The state's authority over
children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults . . . . What
may be wholly permissible [conduct] for adults . . . may not be for children
"74

In Butler v. Michigan7- the Court struck down a state obscenity conviction. The Michigan statute made it illegal "to sell . . . any book . . . [or]
picture . . . containing obscene, immoral, lewd, or lascivious language . . .

tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts .......
The
trial judge found that the defendant had violated the statute by selling to
an adult a book that had a potentially deleterious influence upon youth.
Without exploring the breadth of the state's powers, Justice Frankfurter
found the statute was "not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is
said to deal." With the avowed purpose of protecting juveniles, the state had
in effect reduced "the adult population of Michigan to reading only what
is fit for children." By alluding to Butler the Court in Redrup was clearly
advising states that while separate restrictions might be imposed upon the
kind of material that might not be offered for sale to juveniles, legislators
were obliged to carefully distinguish their treatment of materials that might
not be marketed to adults.
As for the second principle, the Court said: "In none was there any
suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by publication in a manner
so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid
exposure to it."76
In Breard v. Alexandria7 the Court spoke of the duty of local government to protect "its citizens against the practices deemed subversive of privacy
and quiet." The defendant, a door-to-door salesman, contended he had been
denied his first amendment rights because of an ordinance that required that
he obtain the homeowner's consent prior to his going to the door. The

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 169.
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).
341 U.S. 622 (1951).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol22/iss4/3

22

Tucker: The Law of Obscenity--Where Has It Gone?
1970]

THE LAW OF OBSCENITY

Court acknowledged that merely because the accused was engaged in a
commercial venture, he was not denied per se, the protection of the first
amendment. However, said Justice Reed, the first and fourteenth amendments are not "absolutes .... Rights other than those of the advocates are
involved." Only by adjusting various rights could there be "both full liberty
of expression and orderly life." Reed distinguished an earlier case, in which
the Court set aside a similar conviction, on the ground that there the defendant had not engaged in a commercial transaction but in the free distribution
of religious materials. According to Reed "the conveniences between some
householders' desire for privacy and the publisher's right to distribute publications" door-to-door had to be balanced. The collision of rights between
the hospitable housewife and the possibly persistent solicitor, in the Court's
opinion, could, if local government chose, be resolved in favor of the housewife.
7
the Court ruled that a passenger
In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak*
was not denied a constitutional right when the Commission failed to ban the
reception of radio broadcasts on busses in service. The volume of the transmission was high enough to be heard but not so high as to "interfere substantially with the conversation of passengers." The first amendment, the
Court observed, does not guarantee "a freedom to listen only to such points
of view as the listener wishes to hear." Nor does the fifth amendment "secure
to each passenger on a public vehicle regulated by the Federal Government a
right of privacy substantially equal to the privacy to which he is entitled
in his own home . . . .The liberty of each individual in a public vehicle
or public place is subject to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights
79
of others."
By citing Breard and Pollak the Court in Redrup obviously wished to
focus attention on the fundamental distinction between one's right to privacy
in his home and in a public place. Consistent with the first amendment, the
right to be free from obscene material being thrust upon one in his own
home may be a right that the government may protect by placing some curb
on the distribution of objectionable printed material. The power of government, however, is considerably less in regard to the suppressing of material
in a public place, regardless of how objectionable it may be to particular
individuals who happen to be present at the time of its distribution.80
78. 848 U.S. 451 (1952).
79. Id. at 465.
80. Senator Mansfield (D. Mont.) has spoken in favor of legislation designed to allow
a homeowner to free himself from unwanted exposure to obscene material, which may arrive
in his mail. See 115 CONG. REc. S. 8571-72, S. 13973, S. 16136-37. He introduced S. 8220,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., (1969), which requires senders to mark the envelope or cover with
the words: "The Enclosed Material May Be Obscene or Offensive to the Addressee." The
bill sets forth the circumstances under which such markings must be made and the penalties for the failure of a sender to do so. Does one who deals with printed or other forms
of written material do so at his risk, always subject to possible conviction under an
obscenity statute whether he knew the nature of the material or not? No. In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the Court ruled that one might not be constitutionally convicted of unlawfully trafficking in obscene material unless in the course of the trial it is
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After having stated the two principles considered above, the Court in
Redrup noted the absence of "evidence of the sort of 'pandering' which the
Court found significant in Ginzburg v. United States .
8.1.."I"
In regard to both cases the Court found "the distribution of the publications" was protected by the first and fourteenth amendments "from governmental suppression, whether criminal or civil, in personam or in rem." The
Court then proceeded to pinpoint the differences in opinion of the members
of the Court as to the actual demands of the first and fourteenth amendments as follows:
(1) the contention of Justices Black and Douglas that states have
no "power to suppress, control, or punish the distribution of any writing
or pictures upon the ground of their 'obscenity' ";
(2) Justice Stewart's "opinion that a state's power in this area is
narrowly limited to a distinct and clearly identifiable class of materials";
(3) the view of Justice Brennan, with whom Chief Justice Warren
and Justice Fortas agreed, that under Roth a state may not suppress
material unless it is "patently offensive" and is "utterly without redeeming
social value"
with the coalescence of the three elements mentioned in
s2
Memoirs;

(4) the view of Justice White that the " 'social value' element [is not
to be treated] as an independent factor ...."83

established that the accused did so knowingly. Absent a showing of scienter- the existence
of a mens rea-a conviction under an obscenity statute cannot stand.
39 U.S.C. §4009 (1964) provides that one who "mails or causes to be mailed any pandering advertisement which offers for sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion
believes to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative shall be subject to an order of
the Postmaster General to refrain from further mailing of such materials to" addressees who
have made a request of the Postmaster General for a prohibitive order. In Rowan v. United
States Post Office Dep't. 300 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 397 U.S. 728 (1970),
a three-man bench sustained the statute, referring to "an unwilling recipient's right to
privacy," citing Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
81. Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).
82. The concurrence of the Chief Justice is, of course, subject to his approval of an
"environmental" approach and a "sufficient evidence" standard of appellate review.
83. The Court in Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 771 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
describing Justice Stewart's view, wrote: "A third has held to the opinion that a State's
power in this area is narrowly limited to a distinct and clearly identifiable class of material."
Then, alluding to Justice Brennan's position, the Court said: "Others have subscribed to a
not dissimilar standard .......
This portion of the opinion was, in the opinion of the
court in Luros v. United States, 389 F.2d 200, 205 (8th Cir. 1968), a "specific indication that
a majority of the Supreme Court adopts standards 'not dissimilar' to banning only 'hardcore' pornography." Similarly, in State v. J. L. Marshall News Co., 13 Ohio Misc. 60, 232
N.E.2d 435 (1967), the court expressed the view that Redrup established that anything less
than "hard-core" pornography was constitutionally protected. Contra, Stein v. Batchelor, 300
F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 396 U.S. 954 (1969); State v.
Reese, 222 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1969); Hewitt v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 253 Md. 277,
254 A.2d 202 (1969). In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), the Court did not indicate
that Roth had been altered to shield anything other than "hard-core pornography" from
government regulation.
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Regardless of which of the tests might be applied in the three cases, the
Court held that none of the judgments could stand.
Justice Harlan, with whom Justice Clark joined, dissented on procedural
grounds. In his opinion, the Court had improperly proceeded to consider
the question of the obscenity of the publications.
In Ginsberg v. New York 84 the Court raised Redrup to significant precedential status. The defendant was convicted under a statute that prohibited
one from knowingly selling "'to a minor' under 17 . . . 'any picture . . .
which depicts nudity . . . and which is harmful to minors,' and . . . any
'magazine . . . which contains . . . [such pictures] and which, taken as
a

whole, is harmful to minors.' "85 The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the statute and his conviction on the ground that a state could
not make a distinction on the basis of the age of a prospective reader.
In delivering the Court's opinion, Justice Brennan asserted that the
material in issue was "not obscene for adults," citing Butler. The statute
did not run afoul of Butler v. Michigan, since it did not prohibit the sale of
the material to persons seventeen years of age or older. The majority abided
by the postulate that "[o]bscenity is not within the area of protected speech
or press." A state, if it wished, could adopt a "'variable concept of obscenity.'" It could, when dealing with juveniles, adjust the demands of Roth
as they were spelled out in Memoirs. Prince v. Massachusetts was extensively
cited to support the proposition that a state possessed greater power when it
regulated what children might "read or see" about sex than when it undertook to regulate adult conduct. Favoring the adoption of a rule of reason,
the majority contended that reasonable state restraints on the sale to juveniles
of material concerning sex are acceptable under the first amendment. What
may be constitutionally protected for adult purposes may not be for minors.
Here, the state had not acted irrationally. To'sustain state action it need
not be scientifically established that the action is correct. As it had done
previously, the Court rejected the need, in obscenity cases, to invoke a "clear
and present danger" test of constitutionality.
Justice Stewart, concurring in the result, found that the statute was not
unconstitutional on its face. He was of the opinion that a state "may deprive
children of other rights - the right to marry, for example, or the right to vote
- deprivations that would be constitutionally intolerable for adults."
He
compared a child to "someone in a captive audience." Neither, in his opinion,
are "possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 86
Justice Douglas, with whom Justice Black concurred, dissented. Douglas
did not fear that material, which some persons might classify as obscene,
could have a debasing influence on the young. Insisting that the first amendment banned any governmental interference with speech or press, Douglas
disapproved of a rule of reason to test the validity of a statute designed to
84. 390 U.s.629 (1968).
85. Id. at 634, citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
86. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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shield minors from obscenity. While parents and religious organizations
might engage in censorship schemes, government may not. Douglas foresaw
the Court sitting as the "Nation's board of censors," a task for which it was
not qualified.
Justice Fortas, dissenting, refused simply to consider the face of the
statute. In his opinion the Court's duty was to decide whether the material
sold by the defendant was in fact obscene. While he did not disagree with a
"'variable obscenity' " test, he insisted that the Court could not affirm the
conviction without defining what obscene means in terms of the young. 7
This was not a case of pandering of vulgar materials upon a juvenile. The
sixteen-year-old to whom the material was sold had purchased it at the request
of his mother. On the basis of Redrup and Ginzburg, Fortas voted to reverse
the conviction.
All the above cases have involved a challenge to federal or state action
by an individual somehow engaged in commercial activity. In the course of
the proceedings the accused invoked his right to speak or to publish, or
the right of prospective readers or viewers to choose to hear and to read what
they wished. In Stanley v. Georgia,88 the Supreme Court, for the first time,
ruled on the right of an individual to possess obscene material for personal
use in his own home.
The Court ruled that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibited
government from making "the mere private possession of obscene matter
... a crime." While Roth remained unimpaired its assertion that "obscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press' was held
not to apply to "mere private possession of obscene materials." Roth and
its progeny related only to "the regulation of commercial distribution of
obscene material."
Justice Marshall, who delivered the opinion, spoke of a constitutional
"right to receive information and ideas . . .regardless of their social worth."

He declined to draw a "line between the transmission of ideas and mere
entertainment." Here the challenged matter, three reels of film, was discovered in the defendant's home. There was no evidence that the accused
intended to share it with others. While instances might arise in which
government might lawfully intrude into the privacy of one's home, this was
not such an instance. Marshall quoted from a dissenting opinion of Justice
Brandeis: "[The Constitution protects one's] 'beliefs . . . thoughts . .
emotions and . . . sensations . .

.

. The makers of the Constitution . . .

conferred [on individuals] as against the Government, the right to be let
alone ....'-89 The defendant maintained he had "the right to read or observe
what he pleases - the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs

87. Justice Fortas' insistence that the court shun abstractions and deal with specifics
raises the same kind of question other members of the court have raised on other occassions. See note 29 supra.
88. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See Comment, Constitutional Law: Possession of Obscene Material in the Home is Constitutionally Protected, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 138 (1969).
89. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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in the privacy of his own home." He claimed he had "the right to be free
from state inquiry into the contents of his library." Marshall agreed: 90
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds.
Justice Marshall denied that a state could, under the first amendment,
control the moral content of a person's thoughts. Bare possession of obscene
material might not be outlawed by a state because it might lead to antisocial
behavior or could assist the state in the control of illegal sales of obscene
material. While the dear and present danger test was not applicable in cases
of public dissemination of obscene material, it does apply to cases involving
private possession. Here the state had not shown a danger the film "might
fall into the hands of children . . . or that it might intrude upon the sensi-

bilities or privacy of the general public." 91
Justice Black concurred in the result since he did not believe possession
of any reading matter or movie film, "whether labeled obscene or not," could
be made a crime under "the First Amendment, made applicable to the States
by the Fourteenth."
Justice Stewart, who was joined by Justices Brennan and White, also
concurred in reversing the conviction. They did not reach the obscenity question, however. The films, in Stewart's opinion, had been "seized in violation
of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments," and therefore "were inadmissible
in evidence."92
90. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). In Ackerman v. United States, 293 F.2d
449 (9th Cir. 1961), the court found 18 U.S.C. §1461, note 26 supra, applied to private
correspondence.
91. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969). In Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp.
602, 659 (N.D. Tex. 1969), prob. juris. noted, 396 U.S. 954 (1969), the three-man
bench found unconstitutional a state that made "mere possession of obscene material" unlawful. Citing Stanley, the court found that the statute was "overbroad," failing to "confine
its application to a context of public or commercial dissemination."
92. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 572 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart
cited the landmark case of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). In Mapp the Court abandoned the Palko "ordered liberty" standard and ruled that a state might not rely upon
illegally seized evidence to convict an accused. On the same day the Court decided Mapp, it
handed down Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961). In Marcus, under state law,
a magistrate issued a warrant, after submission to him of an affidavit. Officers thereafter
seized a quantity of printed material that the state court found to include obscene as
well as nonobscene material. In the opinion of the Supreme Court the state procedure
did not adequately protect free speech and press. It permitted state police officers to decide
what to seize and what not to seize. The Court also pointed out that the owner was "not
afforded a hearing before the warrant" was issued. The ex parte arrangement, under the
circumstances was found to be objectionable.
The court expanded upon Marcus in A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S.
205 (1964). On this occasion the Court found defective a practice that allowed state
officers to seize any items they viewed as obscene without the defendant first being afforded
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CONCLUSION

Except for Justices Douglas and Black the Supreme Court has clung,
although at times tenuously, to the announcement in Chaplinsky that obscenity is outside the pale of constitutional protection. Justices Black and
Douglas alone insisted that absent a close tie between the spoken or written
word and action, regardless of the way in which sex is treated, speech and
press are free from any form of governmental control. Regardless of the
circumstances, any form of censorship, except for a stringently applied "clear
and present danger" standard, contravenes the Constitution.
The other members of the Court have indicated they agree, in some form,
with the premise that there are certain kinds of ideas, thoughts, expressions,
and photographs that deal with sex in a particular fashion, which government, under some circumstances, may constitutionally bar from public distribution and observation. Some opinions express the belief that the best
interests of society demand that certain moral standards be maintained.
"Moral" in this context means that persons are not free to treat sex in any
way they choose - that there are certain do's and do not's, which morality
demands. Supreme Court justices have paid scant attention to why they
act as they do, assuming instead that everybody knows why. Perhaps they
act as they do because of their religious belief, the way in which they view
the human psyche, or merely a personal notion of what is right and what
is wrong. The Justices may take for granted a myriad of reasons, all good
and valid, which allegedly need not be expressed. Only recently has Justice

a hearing on the question of the obscenity of the seized materials prior to issuance of the
warrant that provided for the seizure. In Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 US. 636

(1968), the Court ruled inadmissible film seized pursuant to a warrant granted on the
basis of an affidavit that contained "conclusory assertions" that the materials to be seized were
obscene. The Court refrained from deciding if an issuing magistrate was obliged, prior to
granting a warrant, to view the challenged film.
In Van Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814 (1969), reversing State v. Van Cleef, 102 N.J.
Super. 102, 245 A.2d 495 (1968), the Court struck down a conviction under a state obscenity
law. The search, which yielded the purportedly obscene material, was conducted after the
arrest of the defendant. In the opinion of the Court the search was not a lawful search
incident to an arrest since it was far too sweeping to meet the demands of the fourth
amendment. In City of Youngstown v. DeLoreto, 19 Ohio App. 2d 267, 281 N.E.2d 491, 48
Ohio Op. 2d 393 (1969), the taking of material from a bookseller by police officers was
sustained. The court ruled that Marcus and Lee Art Theatre, Inc. were distinguishable
since here the accused had not objected to the police officers when they informed him that
they were removing the material from his shop. In South Florida Art Theatres, Inc. v.
State, 224 So. 2d 706 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969), the issuing magistrate heard testimony about
the film in question before he issued the warrant. The court distinguished Lee Art Theatre,
Inc. on the ground that in Lee the magistrate issued the warrant only after receipt of
"conclusory assertions." The unique nature of printed material under the Constitution
was pointed out in Dykema v. Bloss, 169 N.W.2d 367, 375 (Mich. 1969), wherein the court
said: "Printed matter is treated differently than gambling equipment because gambling
equipment is contraband, per se. Printed matter may or may not be obscene based upon
consideration of the entire contents of each publication."
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Douglas chosen to express his views.3 A number of lower court judges have
94
done likewise.
As the membership of the Supreme Court changes during the 1970's, the
Tribunal will undoubtedly find itself once again involved in drawing new
lines, in breathing new meaning into already announced principles 5 The
93. "Some people think that 'obscenity' is not protected by the Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses of the First Amendment. They believe that both Congress and the States can
set up regimes of censorship to weed out 'obscenity' from literature, movies, and other
publications so as to rid the press of what they the judges deem to be beyond the pale. I
have consistently dissented from that court but not because, as frequently charged, I relish
'obscenity.' . . . 'Obscenity' certainly was not an established exception to free speech and
free press when the Bill of Rights was adopted . . . . It is a relatively new arrival on the
American scene, propelled by dedicated zealots to cleanse all thought." Byrne v. Karalexis,
90 S. Ct. 469, 471-72 (1970).
94. One of the most pointed objections to the current state of the law can be found in
the dissenting opinion of Judge Musmanno in Commonwealth v. Dell Publications, Inc., 427
Pa. 189, 223, 233 A.2d 840, 858 (1967). Incensed that the majority failed to find the book
Candy "legally obscene," he wrote: "The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had an opportunity
in this case to unlimber some heavy artillery in fighting for American morality; it had unlimited freedom to pour devastating fire into the forces that would destroy the very
foundations of decency, purity and wholesome conduct upon which our American society
is founded; it had the clearest chance to draw from the armory of the law the weapons
which would beat back those who, for greed and lucre, would poison the minds of the
youth of our Commonwealth . . . . The Majority of this Court retired from the field of
battle without firing a shot. It did more. It encouraged the foul foe to smash more
effectively at the bastions of American decency; it unfurled a flag of impeccability and
authority over the invading filthy battalions; it supplied to each hoodlum in the putrid
expeditionary force a bar of Ivory Soap which made him, according to the Majority's
reasoning, 9914% purel" After pointing out that the court could have found the book obscene
and asking "Whom would such a decision have hurt or offended?," Musmanno wrote: "No
one but those who are heaping up sordid dollars, as a rake gathers up rotten leaves in an
abandoned and unseeded garden."
In Larkin v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 402, 200 N.E.2d 760, 765 (1964), Justice
Scileppi, dissenting, expressed consternation about the state of the law in saying: "It is
important to remember that the history of control of obscenity has deep roots in AngloSaxon traditions, and laws forbidding obscene publications are at least as old as printing
....
The majority opinion here, in my view, sounds the death knell of the long-honored
standards of American decency which have remained an integral part of our national
heritage."
"The morals of the citizens of a nation determine that nation's progress and the length
of her very life. All thinking men realize that if we cherish our great nation, if we love,
her, and would have her prosper and be a great force for good in this world - it is imperative that her ideals and morals be maintained on a high plane." Dykema v. Bloss, 169
N.W.2d 367, 375 (Mich. 1969). But see Zeitlin v. Arnebergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 905, 383 P.2d 152,
155, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800, 803 (1963) and State v. J. L. Marshall News Co., 13 Ohio Misc. 60, 62,
232 N.E.2d 435, 437 (1967). In Zeitlin the court expressed a fear that unless courts moved
with "utmost caution" they would "only invite defeat and only impair man's most precious
potentiality: his capacity for self-expression." In J.L. Marshall News Co. the court declared:
"[I]n a democratic society, except in the prohibition of clearly definable acts of aggression
by one member of soclety against another, the law cannot enforce morality, however desirable such an aim might be. The burden of teaching man to choose the good and reject
the evil must rest as it traditionally has on the family, the school and the church. It
cannot be gainsaid that this is the only sound foundation."
95. If Judge Clement F. Haynesworth, Jr. had gathered sufficient support in the United
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96
Court will find it difficult to "verbalize" adequate standards in this area.
As scientific, mathematical, computer-age man craves certainty, his quest for
preciseness in the law of obscenity is destined to fail. As some members of
the Court have stated, what is and what is not obscene is a matter of personal
taste. Neat, precise, carefully worded principles hold no promise of successfully transforming the law of obscenity into a stronghold of objectivity.
Perhaps Justice Stewart's assertion that he knows "hard-core pornography"
when he sees it, is the most outspoken and relevant judicial admission to date.
Presently many insist that the moral fabric of the Nation is in a serious
state of decay. The treatment of sex, they say, must be kept within circumscribed limits of acceptability. They are calling for more action on the federal
level, and these entreaties have been greeted with some success. President
Nixon has joined those who are calling upon Congress to enact acceptable
legislation restricting commercial ventures that focus on the purveying of
material dealing with sex. 97 The kind of legislative action sought is based on

States Senate to be confirmed as a member of the Supreme Court, he probably would have
been an addition to that sector of the Court that has taken a more liberal view of the
power of government to suppress material on the basis of its obscene nature. As the Chief
Justice of the Fourth Circuit he wrote two opinions that affirmed lower court findings
that material fell outside the pale of constitutional protection. United States v. Potomac
News Co., 373 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1967), reversed, per curiam, (Warren, CJ., dissenting);
Potomac News Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 47 (1967); United States v. 392 Copies of a
Magazine Entitled "Exclusive," 373 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1967), reversed, per curiam, (Warren,
C.J., voting to affirm); Central Magazine Sales, Ltd. v. United States, 389 U.S. 50 (1967).
96. The inability of the Supreme Court to concoct a test of reasonable certainty to
determine whether challenged material falls within or outside the pale of constitutional
protection has given rise to a "comparative analysis" or "book weighing" technique. When
having to decide whether a particular book is or is not obscene in the constitutional sense,
lower courts have undertaken to use as a frame of reference material that the Supreme
Court already found to come within the protection of the first or fourteenth amendments.
In Larkin v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 14 N.Y.2d 399, 403, 200 N.E.2d 760, 762, 252 N.Y.S.2d
71, 74 (1964), the court, comparing the material in question with material previously passed
on, wrote: "It is not easy to distinguish the cases on the basis of real differences in the
material under scrutiny. Still the decisions are not whimsical and haphazard judicial choices,
but resulted in each case from earnestly searching out the significant constitutional issues."
In State v. Childs, 447 P.2d 304, 308 (Ore. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 931 (1969), the
court said: "We have examined other available contemporary 'pulp' books such as 'Lust
Pool' and 'Shame Agent' which were approved in Redrup v. New York . . . and find the
book under present consideration to have been written with considerably less restraint." In
In re Panchot, 70 Cal. 2d 105, 108, 448 P.2d 385, 387, 73 Cal. Rptr. 689, 691 (1968), the
court said: "'Given the materials to which the Supreme Court has accorded constitutional
protection, we cannot withhold such protection here.'" See also Olsen v. Doerfler, 14 Mich.
App. 428, 165 N.W.2d 648 (1969); State v. J. L. Marshall News Co., 13 Ohio Misc. 60, 232
N.E.2d 435 (1969); House of Commonwealth, 210 Va. 120, 169 S.E.2d 572 (1969). In view
of the use of a "comparative" approach, it would appear that a defendant, seeking to refute
a contention that material is obscene, might offer evidence of other books in circulation in
the "community" to establish the standard of the average man. The possibility of excessive
introduction of books, and the competence of the trial judge to decide the question of
admissibility of other books was considered by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State
v. Van Cleef, 102 N.J. Super. 102, 245 A.2d 495 (1968).
97. On May 5, 1969, the President sent a message to the Congress in which he said:
"American homes are being bombarded with the largest volume of sex-oriented mail in
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the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court allowing some form of
government regulation of obscenity. Authorization for constitutional government action, whether on the federal or state level, is found primarily in the
areas of juveniles, privacy, and pandering. Some strength can also be
found in the prevailing definitions of obscenity.
The "utterly without" standard places a minimum restriction on material
that may be distributed to adults in the absence of pandering and the invasion
of an adult's privacy. A supporter of the "hard-core pornography" school
presumably will favor striking down government action on occasions when
a supporter of the "utterly without" school would. Thus, the "utterly
without" test is closely akin to the "hard-core pornography" school. However, the question remains whether material can have some "redeeming social
value" if it is "hard-core pornography."
Proponents of the "environmental" or "setting" school have enjoyed
substantial success. The pandering, juvenile, and privacy categories reflect
approval of some form of an environmental approach to obscenity. Recognition of these areas as distinct categories also reflects a quantum of success
for the advocates of a "rule of reason." But the rationalists would undoubtedly go much farther than the environmentalists in sustaining government
control of particular sorts of speech and press. Proponents of a "rule of
reason" would more easily find societal interests paramount to free speech
and press than those who stress environment over content. The thinking of
both schools dearly blends in regard to the breadth of appellate review of
obscenity cases. Environmentalists as well as rationalists could accept, and on
occasion have accepted, the "sufficient evidence" test. So far, the members
of these two schools have been unable to persuade a majority of the Court
to invoke the "sufficient evidence" test. De novo consideration and independent judicial judgment still characterize the thinking of the Court.98
history." He asked that Congress make it a federal crime to "use the mails or other facilities
of commerce to deliver to anyone under 18 years of age material dealing with a sexual
subject in a manner unsuitable for young people . . . . or to use the mails, or other
facilities of commerce, for the commercial exploitation of a prurient interest in sex through
advertising." He asked Congress to supplement 39 U.S.C. §4009 (1964), note 48 supra, to
facilitate persons obtaining prohibitory orders. For the full text of the President's message,
and a copy of his proposed legislation, see H.R. Doc. No. 91-114, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
In his State of the Union Message on January 22, 1970, the President pointed to pornography
as an area in which "the Federal Government has a special responsibility it should
11
fulfill ....
98. Under the de novo principle, is there anything more than an advisory role for a
jury in obscenity cases in those instances in which it fails to return a verdict of not guilty or
acquittal? Patently a jury cannot bind an appellate tribunal that undertakes to apply its
own constitutional judgment as to whether the material in question is obscene. In People
v. Clark, 304 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (1969), the court asserted: "The determination of obscenity is a
question of law for the court to decide." In United States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled
"Pattern of Evil," 804 F. Supp. 197, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court denied a motion for
summary judgment. "If . . . issues of material fact are raised in respect of each of the
three elements of obscenity, summary judgment on affidavits and exhibits is inappropriate and a trial of the issues is requisite. The expert opinions submitted as evidence are
in conflict on the point whether social value inheres to this film." Query: Does it matter
what the experts say if it conflicts with the court's "constitutional judgment"?
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Firmly entrenched is the principle that each member of the Court must,
in every obscenity case, examine the challenged material and then arrive at
a personal judgment as to whether the book, magazine, film, or picture is
obscene in the constitutional sense.
A foreseeable concomitant of the Court's acknowledged respect for privacy
was the adoption of the Stanley principle. Under Stanley an individual, in
the privacy of his own home, may wallow in obscenity, free from government
interference, unless a "clear and present danger" test is satisfied. In the
years ahead, Stanley may serve as a vehicle to expand the liberty to speak
and to publish whatever one wishes. In Stanley the Court acknowledged a
right to receive. Can a right to disseminate be any narrower than a right
to receive? Any restriction on dissemination must impair one's right to
receive. At present it is not possible to perceive what use, if any, the Court
will make of Stanley to further shed speech and press of government control.
The attractiveness of Roth in a democratic society is apparent. If one
accepts the proposition that majority rule is good, then a test tied to contemporary community standards and the average person must be favorably
received. Ideally, if a majority in a democracy desires a particular standard
regarding the treatment of sex, why not let them have it? Would they not
be entitled to it under a doctrinaire approach to participatory democracy?
But, as with other aspects of the constitutional principles governing obscenity,
this concept abounds with danger and uncertainty. What of minority rights
and the proposition that persons should not have the right to impose their
standards on others by resorting to governmental force? Independent of this
and similar questions remains the difficulty of applying Roth, assuming
that one wishes to do so. How can members of the Court actually determine
level of tolerance acceptable to the present day average man insofar as the
treatment of sex is concerned? Where should the judges look to gauge the
sympathies of a population in excess of 200 million persons, of various beliefs,
spread across a vast geographic expanse? Should the jurists look to theologians;
humanists; city, state, and federal legislators; lower court judges; motion picture producers; publishers; school newspapers; associations for decency; associations for liberty; communes; nudist colonies; Broadway; off-Broadway; faroff-Broadway; book store owners - to whom? Perhaps Roth is unreal, perhaps
it is impossible to apply. Perhaps it simply stands, as already pointed out, for
a subjective standard of constitutional doctrine.
What most members of the Court apparently agree on, although not
unanimously, is that the fourteenth amendment applies the same restrictions
to state action as are imposed upon the federal government. This seems to
be the one principle in the law of obscenity that is not in danger of being
shunted aside during the 1970's. 99
99. Justice Harlan appears to have gained the support of Chief Justice Burger for his
dual approach to obscenity under the first and fourteenth amendments. In Carlos v. New
York, 396 U.S. 119 (1970), Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Harlan in dissent.
The Court, per curiam, reversed a lower court judgment in which the petitioner
had been convicted of violating a state obscenity statute, citing Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767 (1967). The Chief Justice and Justice Harlan were of the opinion that certiorari
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Reading and viewing in the 1970's promises to be exciting. So too will
be the Supreme Court's decisions as to what persons may and may not be
100
barred from reading or viewing.

should not have been granted but, since the Court granted review, they were of the opinion
that the judgment should be affirmed. They cited Harlan's opinions in Roth and Memoirs.
Harlan's insistence on a dual standard, one for the federal government and one for the
state government, is consistent with his vigorous disagreement with the result the Court
arrived at in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), wherein Palko was overruled. Dissenting in Benton, Harlan wrote: "I would hold, in accordance with Palko v. Connecticut ... that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take over the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth, as such. Today Palko becomes another casualty in
the so far unchecked march toward 'incorporating' much, if not all, of the Federal Bill of
Rights into the Due Process Clause ... . I . . . raise my voice again in protest against a
doctrine which so subtly, yet profoundly, is eroding many of the basics of our federal
system." Id. at 808-09.
100. One of the questions yet to be answered is: "Will 'I Am Curious - Yellow' make
the Late Show uncut?" As yet there is no definitive answer as to whether it can even make
all of the Nation's local movie theatre screens uncut. Courts have arrived at different
results as to whether the film falls within the pale of constitutional protection. In United
States v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "I Am Curious--Yellow," 404 F.2d 196, 200 (2d
Cir. 1968) the court did not find that the three elements, spoken of in Memoirs, supra,
coalesced. It did not find that "the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals
to the prurient interest in sex" nor that it was "utterly without redeeming social value."
It was found to come "within the ambit of intellectual effort that the First Amendment
was designed to protect." Contra, Wagonheim v. Maryland State Bd. of Censors, 38 U.S.L.W.
2267 (Gen. Nov. 11, 1969). The Supreme Court may have the opportunity to rule on the
question in the near future, see Byrne v. Karalexis, 90 S.Ct. 469 (1970).
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